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Constitutional Thematics and the Peculiar Federal
Marriage Amendment
Scott Dodson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Thank you, and thank you to the law school for hosting this
conference and to Professor Wardle for inviting me here today. I am
honored to be a part of this panel. I look forward to sharing my ideas
with you, and to a lively debate on this important topic.
As an aside, I must say that I find it intriguing that several panelists
have alluded to the prevalence of marriage protection provisions in
foreign nations. It strikes me that perhaps they have stumbled upon a
rather clever basis for our Supreme Court to protect marriage: let’s just
call traditional marriage a matter of international law and be done with it!
Humor aside, I am not going to take a position on whether banning
same-sex marriage is right or wrong as a matter of social policy. I leave
that to others today. Instead, I want to focus on the Constitution itself,
and how that document could change if the current form of the Federal
Marriage Amendment, or FMA, banning same-sex marriage, is appended
to it.
The FMA, in its current form, consists of two sentences. The first
states: “Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a
man and a woman.”1 This sentence would prohibit any state—whether by
judicial decree, gubernatorial effort, legislative process, popular

* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Arkansas School of Law. I presented the
substance of this paper at a symposium titled “A Federal Marriage Amendment” held at the J.
Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University. More information on that symposium,
including an audio recording of the presentations, responses, and questions, can be found at
http://www.law2.byu.edu/OrganizationsNew/Marriage_Family/conferences.php.
The
views
expressed herein are mine and do not necessarily reflect those of any other person or entity.
1. S.J. Res. 40, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004); H.J. Res. 106, 108th Cong. § 2 (2004). The Senate
version died when cloture failed (forty-eight to fifty) on July 14, 2005. See http://www.senate.gov
/legislative/LIS/roll_call_lists/roll_call_vote_cfm.cfm?congress=108&session=2&vote=00155 (last
visited Aug. 31, 2005). The House version reached a vote but failed to pass by the required twothirds supermajority (227 to 186) on September 30, 2004. See http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2004
/roll484.xml (last visited Aug. 31, 2005). A similar proposal was introduced in the 109th Congress.
See S.J. Res. 1 § 1, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005), available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery
/z?d109:sj00001:@@@L&summ2=m&>; H.R.J. Res. 39 § 1, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005),
available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:hj00039:@@@L&summ2=m&.
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referendum, or state constitutional amendment—from granting marital
status to, or recognizing the marital status of, same-sex couples.
The second sentence originally stated: “Neither this Constitution, nor
the constitution of any State, shall be construed to require that marriage
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other than the
union of a man and a woman.”2 However, this sentence has been
subsequently altered and now states: “No court of the United States or
any State shall have jurisdiction to determine whether this Constitution
or the constitution of any State requires that the legal incidents of
marriage be conferred upon any union other than a legal union between
one man and one woman.”3 Either way, this second sentence in the FMA
prohibits a state from constitutionally extending the legal benefits of
marriage to same-sex couples.4
There is something quite remarkable about this FMA. It takes power
away from the states. Well, that is no big deal; the Constitution takes
many powers away from the states. But the FMA takes power away from
the states in derogation of individual liberty and equality. This is a very
peculiar power shift. Indeed, I can find nothing else like it in the
Constitution.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL THEMATICS
Our Constitution is thematic. Generally, it paints with broad strokes
based on recognizable and coherent themes. You could probably name a
few off the top of your head: separation of powers is one that comes
readily to mind. This is a particularly good illustration because although
no one really questions that it is a part of the constitutional structure and
meaning, the phrase “separation of powers” is not explicitly mentioned
or mandated.5
I am taking this opportunity to talk about how the FMA could affect
2. S.J. Res. 40 § 2 (2004); H.R.J. Res. 106 § 2, 108th Cong. (2004); see also S.J. Res. 1 § 1,
109th Cong. (2005).
3. H.R.J. Res. 39 § 2, 108th Cong. (2005).
4. Technically, the FMA only prevents state courts from “construing” their own
constitutions in a particular way and does not prevent the citizens of a state from adopting a
particular state constitutional amendment. But, say a state adopted a state constitutional amendment
that required that the legal incidents of marriage be extended to same-sex couples, precisely what the
FMA prohibits. The FMA would then prevent the state’s courts from giving the state constitutional
amendment its literal interpretation.
5. See, e.g., Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856)
(holding that a legislative court may not decide a suit at common law or in equity or admiralty
because such a suit is inherently judicial); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (striking down a law
which authorized either House of Congress to veto an executive decision made by the Attorney
General); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (stating that Congress could not
delegate a line-item veto to the President because such power was legislative rather than executive).
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existing constitutional themes and why we ought to care. But, first, I will
outline the particular themes that the FMA affects. There are at least
three of them: a commitment to state power over local matters, individual
liberty, and equality. I doubt that I need to convince anyone here that
these are recognizable themes in our Constitution, but just to make sure,
I’ll make a brief offer of proof.
First, state power. The Constitution’s commitment to state power
over local matters is an important component of federalism and state
sovereignty. Article I limits congressional power to those specifically
enumerated grants in Section 8, which generally focus on national issues.
Apart from somewhat more ambiguously described executive and
judicial powers, all other powers, including the general police power, are
reserved to either the people or the states, as confirmed by the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. Under this division of power, the people of the
several states are, for the most part, free to legislate or constitutionalize
their local affairs as they prefer.6 These local affairs traditionally include
the definition, scope, and effect of marriage.7 The normative benefits of
this federalist structure should be clear: local governance permits discrete
citizenries to develop the laws that suit them best.
Second, liberty. The commitment to individual liberty permeates the
Constitution, which prevents the national government from suspending
the writ of habeas corpus.8 The Constitution prevents the states from
passing ex post facto laws or impairing contracts.9 It provides for trial by
jury;10 limits the definition, punishment, and proof of treason;11 and gives
the President a broad pardoning power.12 In addition, the Bill of Rights
guarantees the individual freedoms of religion and speech, due process of
law, privacy from searches and seizures, and a host of specific
protections for the criminally accused. After the Civil War, the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment significantly broadened
the constitutional commitment to individual liberty by applying most of
the libertarian principles in the Bill of Rights to the states.
6. See Scott Dodson, The Peculiar Federal Marriage Amendment, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 783,
784 (2004).
7. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995) (including marriage within
the ambit of state authority over family law); Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992)
(stating that states are more suited to handling issues that arise out of divorce); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (stating that regulation of marriage is within the states’ police power). But see
Utah Enabling Act, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108 (1894) (requiring Utah to outlaw polygamy as a
condition to admission into the United States).
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2-3.
9. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
10. Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
11. Id. art. III, § 3, cl. 1-2.
12. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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Third, equality. Although equality features far less prominently than
liberty, the Constitution prohibits both the national government and the
states from granting any “Title of Nobility.”13 The Privileges and
Immunities Clause mandates that the citizens of each state be entitled to
the benefits of the citizens in the several states. In addition, the
qualifications for officers and representatives of the national government
are quite sparse;14 a manifestation of the Framers’ visions of a
meritocracy.15 After the Civil War, the Thirteenth Amendment’s
abolition of slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
and Privileges or Immunities Clauses signaled a far stronger commitment
to equality that has continued to this day with steady reminders such as
the Voting Amendments.
Now, I am not saying that these principles are absolute—that just
because they show up prominently they are unabridgeable or
unmalleable. Nor am I saying that their boundaries or scopes are always
cleanly defined or discrete. For example, the Voting Amendments
simultaneously furthers at least two of these constitutional themes
simultaneously.16 What I am saying is that they are recognizable themes,
and they exist in a thematic document. But, why do we care whether the
Constitution is thematic or not?
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL THEMES
Constitutional themes and their inter-coherence are important for at
least two reasons: First, constitutional themes identify fundamental
values of our governing structure. They are the basis of our
understanding of our own government and how it is supposed to work.
Take the one-two punch of liberty and equality, for example. These form
the roots of the modern conception of the Constitution as a defender of
civil rights. We, as a people, wholeheartedly believe in a way that helps
define our nation that the Constitution’s commitments to liberty and
equality set limits on unjustified governmental overreaching into our
civil rights. This modern sentiment has ushered in an unprecedented era
of individual freedom and tolerance for minorities, women, and other
13. Id. art. I, § 9, cl. 8; id. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
14. Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 3; id. art. I, § 2, cl. 2; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 4; id. art. III, § 1; id. art. VI, § 1,
cl. 3.
15. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON OR JAMES MADISON, THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 294
(Clinton Rossiter ed. 1961) (“Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part of the federal
government [the House of Representatives] is open to merit of every description, whether native or
adoptive, whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular
profession of religious faith.”).
16. They further both equality and representative democracy.
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groups. In other words, the Constitution reflects—and affects—the
fundamental values we hold as a people.
Second, constitutional themes assist with constitutional
interpretation. Phrases like “due process,” “freedom of speech,” “cruel
and unusual punishment,” and “equal protection” defy uniform or certain
definition. As an interpretive aid, jurists rely heavily on the established
themes running through the Constitution for guidance when applying
these phrases.
As an example of what I mean by the importance and effect of
constitutional thematics, I quote from Bolling v. Sharpe, which held that
the Fifth Amendment, despite lacking an equal protection clause,
incorporated an equality component into its Due Process Clause:
The Fifth Amendment, which is applicable in the District of Columbia,
does not contain an equal protection clause as does the Fourteenth
Amendment which applies only to the states. But the concepts of equal
protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive. . . . [A]s this Court has recognized,
discrimination may be so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process. . . . In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits the
states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be
unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on
the Federal Government. We hold that racial segregation in the public
schools of the District of Columbia is a denial of the due process of law
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution.17

And just to show that constitutional thematics are important to and
used by both liberals and conservatives alike, let me provide a second
example: state sovereign immunity. The text of the Eleventh Amendment
immunizes states only from suit in federal court by citizens of different
or foreign states.18 But the constitutional principle of state sovereignty—
of which the Eleventh Amendment is just one manifestation—extends
that immunity to suits in state court, to administrative proceedings, and
to suits brought by a state’s own citizens.19
In short, the sums of the prominent constitutional themes are greater
17. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499-500 (1954).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State.”).
19. See Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706 (1999); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). Yet, at the same time, Eleventh
Amendment immunity surrenders to congressional legislation enforcing the equality principles of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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than their parts and give life and meaning to the individual provisions of
the Constitution. They radiate from its text like echoes from a set of
notes that take on different tones and volumes from the surrounding
environment.20
Because of the importance of thematic coherence and consistency,
whenever a constitutional provision runs contrary to a particular theme, it
usually does so only in furtherance of another. Take state power, for
example. Of all of the active Amendments that limit state power beyond
what the original Constitution established, all but the Seventeenth do so
in furtherance of liberty or equality. And the Seventeenth—which
provides for direct election of Senators—furthers another recognizable
theme in the Constitution: representative democracy.
IV. THE PECULIARITY OF THE FMA
Juxtaposed against this coherent, thematic constitutional backdrop,
the proposed FMA is incongruent because it undermines the embedded
constitutional themes of state power, liberty, and equality. For example,
the FMA contradicts the theme of state power by usurping the definition
of marriage, a matter historically reserved to the states under traditional
notions of federalism21 and by removing from the states the power to
constitutionalize equal benefits to same-sex and opposite-sex couples.22
The FMA is also contrary to the theme of liberty because it would
restrict the ability of individuals to marry whom they choose. Now, I am
20. Note that I am not advocating for expansive, rather than strict, construction of the
Constitution here. Constitutional thematics can support a textualist or even an originalist
interpretative view, as the textualists and originalists on the Court have proven in the state sovereign
immunity cases.
21. Some contend that the FMA is pro-federalism, not anti-federalism. See.Lynn D. Wardle,
Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439 (2006); John
C. Eastman, Full Faith and Republican Guarantees: Gay Marriage, FMPA, and the Courts, 20 BYU
J. PUB. L. 243 (2006). What they really rail against, however, is judicial activism, which is not a
disruption of federalism but rather, if anything, a disruption of separation of powers. Given the
restrictions that the FMA imposes on the states to regulate or constitutionalize their own conceptions
of marriage and the legal incidents thereof, I think that the FMA’s hostility to federalism cannot
seriously be disputed.
22. In their presentations, Prof. Wardle and Prof. Eastman—citing Supreme Court decisions
limiting the states’ power to define marriage, such as Loving—suggest that the federal government
already regulates marriage and question why the FMA would then be so peculiar. See.Lynn D.
Wardle, Federal Constitutional Protection for Marriage: Why and How, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 439
(2006); John C. Eastman, Full Faith and Republican Guarantees: Gay Marriage, FMPA, and the
Courts, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 243 (2006). I respond that the difference lies in the effects of the
regulation. Loving, which outlawed bans on interracial marriage, broadened the scope of marriage in
furtherance of individual liberty and equality. Because it furthers two other existing constitutional
themes, Loving is not peculiar at all. The FMA, by contrast, would limit the scope of marriage in
derogation of individual liberty and equality. Because it would disparage three existing
constitutional themes while furthering no other, the FMA is peculiar indeed.
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not saying here that the right to marry someone of the opposite sex is or
should be protected by the Constitution. What I am referring to here are
themes, not specific rights. So, the FMA can be contrary to a theme in
the Constitution without necessarily being contrary to a protectable right.
However, the Constitution’s liberty principle does extend to decisions
about marriage,23 so even though the question of same-sex marriage
remains open24 the theme of individual liberty at a minimum supports it.
At least in this respect, the FMA would emphatically curtail the reach of
the liberty principle.
Likewise, the FMA is also contrary to the theme of equality because
it denies a specified group the benefits and privileges granted to a
different group.25 In Romer v. Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a
provision of the Colorado constitution that specifically disadvantaged
homosexual persons in the political process for no other reason than antigay sentiments.26 The constitutional theme of equality does not permit
such a result.27 Likewise, the FMA, by affirmatively disadvantaging
homosexual persons, would also be adverse to the theme of equality.
Finally, the FMA—unlike even the Seventeenth Amendment—does
not further any other recognizable theme. No existing constitutional
provision is contrary to all three established themes while furthering no
other, which is why I have argued that the FMA would be a rather
“peculiar” amendment.28 Indeed, the only Amendment that even comes
close is the infamous Eighteenth Amendment, which abridged two of
these themes (liberty and state power) but furthered no other. And, as we
all know, the Eighteenth Amendment was a social disaster that has the
dubious distinction of being the only Amendment ever expressly
repealed.
23. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (stating that personal
decisions relating to marriage, “are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (“The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one
of the ‘basic civil rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”); Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (“Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse,
hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a
way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or
social projects.”).
24. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (declining to address whether the
Constitution’s commitment to liberty necessarily provides a right to same-sex marriage); id. at 585
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that, for Equal Protection Clause analyses, the state would
have a legitimate interest in preserving traditional marriage).
25. See Dodson, supra note 7, at 785.
26. 517 U.S. 620, 635-36 (1996).
27. Id. at 623 (stating that the Constitution embodies “a commitment to the law’s neutrality
where the rights of persons are at stake” and that “[t]he Equal Protection Clause enforces this
principle”).
28. See Dodson, supra note 7.
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V. THE EFFECT OF THE FMA ON CONSTITUTIONAL THEMATICS
Adopting an amendment that is so contrary to established
constitutional themes could have serious implications for our
identification of fundamental values and, therefore, coherent
constitutional interpretation. There are at least two questions of
constitutional thematics that the FMA implicates: First, what impact will
the FMA have on the themes that it disparages: state power, liberty, and
equality? Second, what impact will the FMA have on the development of
new constitutional themes, such as an emphasis on marriage or even,
more broadly, on traditional family values?
With respect to the first issue, the disparagement of existing
constitutional themes, does the FMA signal a popular shift away from
these values? Have we as a society determined that social mores are
more important than individual liberty and equality? If so, how will the
FMA affect the interpretation of other libertarian or equality provisions
of the Constitution? For example, will it be construed to narrow the
Equal Protection Clause or the Due Process Clause or any of the other
clauses that I have discussed? How will the FMA affect the treatment of
gay couples in the workplace and in society in general as we as a society
assimilate the broader, more subtle implications of the FMA into
everyday life?
With respect to the second issue, the development of a new
constitutional theme, does the FMA suggest that we as a people view
marriage as a sacred and unalterable institution? Does it more broadly
signal a tacit overturning of Lawrence v. Texas, or at least an affirmation
of the dissenting position in that case that moral legislation is
permissible?29 Would these characterizations then affect the way other
constitutional provisions are interpreted?
The FMA’s disregard of traditional constitutional themes and
adoption of new ones, taken together, portends dramatic shifts in the way
the Constitution could be interpreted. Take, as just one example, the
possibility that the FMA’s emphasis of marriage as a nascent theme and
de-emphasis of state autonomy will expand the Commerce Clause in a
way that allows Congress to begin legislating marriage in order to protect
it from erosion in other ways. Specifically, could the FMA provide a
basis for upholding the constitutionality of a federal law outlawing
divorce? How about a law that restricts adoption (or even procreation)

29. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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only to married persons? What about a condition that requires that any
candidate for federal office be married?
Now, my guess is that a substantial number of Americans, including
people at this symposium, would answer “yes” to some of these
questions and, in fact, would go further to state that these are not just
effects but goals of the FMA. I am not here to argue that these results are
right or wrong. Indeed, if your counterargument is that, on balance, even
fully considering all of the consequences, the protection of marriage is
too valuable a fight to lose, then I will leave our debate for another day.
For now, I merely am saying that the FMA could have far-ranging
consequences that we should do our best to recognize beforehand and
attempt to minimize.
Regardless of your persuasion as to the concept on an FMA, I hope
you will recognize that the FMA raises serious and difficult questions
with uncertain answers. I invite you to query whether, in light of them, it
would be wise to consider carefully, if an FMA is to be had, what
language could minimize the risk of unintended adverse impact on our
Constitution’s themes.
VI. ANOTHER OPTION
So, I propose a kinder, gentler amendment; one which disrupts
existing constitutional themes far less than the proposed FMA and one
which actually furthers other existing constitutional themes. If the true
impetus behind the amendment is to prevent the federal courts from
defining marriage,30 then those who support it should consider striking
the first sentence altogether and striking the reference to state
constitutions in the second. In effect, the FMA could read simply: “This
Constitution shall not be construed to require that marriage or the legal
incidents thereof must be conferred upon any union other than the union
of a man and a woman.”
This language, which affects only the interpretation of the federal
Constitution, would reaffirm that the states have primacy over matters of
marriage. Indeed, if a state so wished, it could constitutionalize same-sex
marriages. In that respect, this version of the FMA would further
federalism values.
In addition, this language would divest federal courts of their ability
to use the ultimate super-legislative authority, the U.S. Constitution, to
create a same-sex marriage right or to overturn legislation to the

30. See Robert H. Bork, Stop Courts from Imposing Gay Marriage, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7,
2001, at A14.
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contrary. By better defining judicial power, it arguably furthers
separation of powers, another constitutional theme that I noted earlier.
Although this version of the FMA would still be in tension with the
themes of liberty and equality, the tension is muted without the first
sentence and is countered by its furtherance of the constitutional themes
of federalism and separation of powers.
And for those who fear that states will have to recognize same-sex
marriages granted in other states, this FMA—with its emphasis on the
importance of marriage and federalism—goes a long way towards
ensuring the constitutionality of DOMA, the federal statute that permits
states to refuse to recognize same-sex marriages performed in other
states.31
Now, I am not saying that I support such an amendment, nor am I
saying that it will avoid all of the problems that I have discussed or that
Professor Strasser raised in his presentation.32 I merely propose it as an
alternative for consideration among those who support some form of the
FMA.
In sum, then, those who are intent on pursuing some form of the
FMA should take a close look at the amendment and its possible effects
on the Constitution. Such a peculiar amendment could have undesirable
consequences. If there must be one at all, let’s have an FMA that
damages existing constitutional themes as little as possible.

31. See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1996).
32. Professor Mark Strasser argued in his presentation for this symposium that the vague
term “incidents of marriage” will create interpretive difficulties. See Mark Strasser, An Amendment
to Protect Marriage: Bad in Theory, Likely Worse in Practice, 20 BYU J. PUL. L. 387 (2006)
(making the same argument). I agree with Prof. Strasser’s comments and add that even the kinder,
gentler FMA would present other interpretative difficulties. For example, what would be the court of
last resort for interpreting this phrase? If it is the U.S. Supreme Court, then the FMA authorizes that
federal court to “construe” state constitutions, something that our federalist system has generally
disallowed. If it is the state courts, then the term may be subject to 51 different interpretations.

